THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

PATENT TYING AGREEMENTS: PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL?
ALISON

K. HAYDEN

ABSTRACT

On January 25, 2005, the CAFC decided the case of Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois
Too] Works, Inc., holding that market power will be presumed in a tying agreement
whenever a tying product is patented.
This rule puts patent holders at a
disadvantage, and will increase the amount of antitrust lawsuits brought against
patent holders and holders of other exclusive intellectual property rights. Indeed,
this rule conflicts with the intended effect of antitrust law. This comment proposes
that tying agreements involving a patented product be evaluated the same way as all
other tying agreements, and that the presumption of market power, a dispositive
factor in antitrust cases, for patented products be eliminated.
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PATENT TYING AGREEMENTS: PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL?
ALISON K. HAYDEN*

"Presumptions may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but
disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts."1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of antitrust law2 is to protect the business economy from the
negative effects of unreasonable restraint of trade, monopolies, price-fixing, and price
3
discrimination. Antitrust law was established to encourage the competitive process.
The history of antitrust litigation proves, however, that this protection actually puts
restraints on the competitive process and makes economic activity less efficient. 4 In
* Juris Doctor Candidate, January 2007, The John Marshall Law School.
Bachelor of
Engineering in Civil Engineering, Vanderbilt University, May 1999. Thank you to my parents, for
their love, support and encouragement always; Dan Lechleiter, for suggesting this topic and his
crash course in Antitrust Law; Professor McGrath, for help with brainstorming and providing
additional sources; Timir Chheda and Kevin Kelly, for painstakingly poring over every word to help
ensure success; and the entire staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law.
1 Mockowik v. Kan.City, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (Mo. 1906).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). (commonly known as The Sherman Act) "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. § 2. "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. " 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000) (commonly known as The Clayton Act).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption or resale within the United States ....
on the
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id.
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 517.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Id.
4 D. T. Armentano, The Immorality ofAntitrust Law, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY, (Aug.,
1999), availablo at http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=4394 (aggressively attacking antitrust law
enforcement and arguing that antitrust law also goes against "commonsense notions of liberty and
justice" because it interferes with the free market and consensual business arrangements and that
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the area of patent law especially, the restraints imposed by antitrust law are
pronounced. In addition to restraining competitive processes, antitrust law may
5
work to restrain the creative processes that patent law seeks to promote.
An example will illustrate the effect of the intersection between these competing
policies. Sports Fan invents a novel, non-obvious, and useful idea for which he
obtains a patent. 6 His invention consists of an apparatus used to affix sunglasses to
a baseball hat.7 In an effort to make a profit, he seeks to market his invention and
share it with others. He creates a license agreement conditioning the use of his
patented apparatus on the purchase of a baseball hat. The license agreement may be
between either Sports Fan and an end user or Sports Fan and a "middle man"
seeking to manufacture and market the apparatus himself, which is typical of many
patent licensing agreements. Although the end user or "middle man" must agree to
purchase a single baseball hat from Sports Fan, they remain free to purchase
additional hats elsewhere.
This type of licensing agreement is known as a "tying" agreement.8 Tying is an
antitrust term used to describe the sale of one product (the "tying" product)
conditioned on the sale of a second product (the "tied" product). 9 Sports Fan's
patented apparatus is the tying product, while the hats for use with the apparatus
are the tied product. 10
Tying agreements are prohibited by antitrust law only when the defendant
possesses a sufficient amount of market power in the tying product market.11 As
inconsistent case law prevents businesses from knowing which practices are illegal and which are
not).
7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04(2) (2000) ("Advancement of the useful arts
is the end, and grant of a limited monopoly the means of the patent laws."); see also William E.
Kovacic & Andreas P. Reindl, An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Improving Competition Policy and
Intellectual Proper-ty Policy, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1062, 1065 ("Unwise antitrust rules can
diminish incentives to create certain forms of property and the capacity to use such property
efficiently."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that whether or
not Xerox's activities constituted a violation of antitrust law, "monetary damage liability could not
be imposed upon Xerox without seriously undermining the patent system").
( See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504 (8th ed. Aug. 2001) ("In design patent applications, ornamentality,
novelty and unobviousness are necessary prerequisites to the grant of a patent.").
7 See U.S. Patent No. 6,792,619 BI (filed Mar. 25, 2003) ("Eyeglasses and pencil retaining
assembly").
s See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1947) (explaining the conditional
tying clause in a contract which required the lessees to purchase all unpatented salt and salt tablets
consumed in the leased (patented) machines as a restrictive licensing agreement).
Christopher R. Leslie, UnilaterallyImposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Concerted
Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1773 (1999) ("A tying arrangement exists when a seller
refuses to sell one product, 'the tying product,' unless the buyer also purchases a second product, 'the
tied product."'); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197 (2001) (describing the tying
agreement as a practice that was once considered exclusionary, but now is recognized as
exclusionary only rarely).
10 Not all tying agreements involve a patented product. This comment proposes that tying
agreements involving a tying product covered by a patent should be analyzed the same way as all
other tying agreements.
11William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Powerin Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV.
937, 937-38(1981).
The term "market power" refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms,
acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many
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defined by the United States Department of Justice, market power is "the ability to
profitably maintain prices above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant
period of time." 12 When a patented product is involved, the United States Supreme
Court ("Court") has noted in dicta that courts might presume market power simply
by existence of the patent on the tying product. 13 However, the Court has not
addressed the specific issue of whether tying agreements are presumptively illegal
when a patent is involved since InternationalSalt v. UnitedStates in 1947.14
On January 25, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
15
("CAFC") decided the case of Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.
Independent Ink, Inc. ("Independent Ink") alleged that Trident, Inc. ("Trident") (a
subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, Inc.) engaged in illegal tying by conditioning the
lease of Trident's patented inkjet technology on the additional sale of Trident ink

sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded.
Market power is a key concept in antitrust law
The standard method of proving market power in antitrust cases involves
first defining a relevant market in which to compute the defendant's market
share, next computing that share, and then deciding whether it is large enough to
support an inference of the required degree of market power. Other evidence - for
example, of the defendant's profits, or of the ability of new firms to enter the
market, or of price discrimination - may be presented to reinforce or refute the
inference from market shares.

Id.
12
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Market power can be exercised in other economic dimensions, such as quality,
service, and the development of new or improved goods and processes. It is
assumed in this definition that all competitive dimensions are held constant
except the ones in which market power is being exercised; that a seller is able to
charge higher prices for a higher-quality product does not alone indicate market
power. The definition in the text is stated in terms of a seller with market power.
A buyer could also exercise market power (e.g., by maintaining the price below the
competitive level, thereby depressing output).
Id. at n.10.
13 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (stating that the "requisite economic
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted" although the case did not
involve any patent); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (stating that if
the seller holds a patent over a product, it can be presumed that the seller has market power due to
purchaser's lack of ability to buy the product from someone else, although this case involved only the
services of anesthesiologists and not a patented product).
14 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1947) (holding that International Salt
was engaged in an illegal restraint of trade by conditioning the lease of its patented machines on the
purchase of its salt).
15 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
73 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1329) [hereinafter Indop. Ink IA. Defendant Trident,
a wholly owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, uses its patented ink jet technology to
manufacture print heads. Id. Trident licenses this technology to other printer manufacturers. Id.
In addition, Trident sells ink for use with its patented technology. Id. at 1345. Independent Ink
also produces ink that can be used in Trident's print heads. Id.
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products. 16 The district court found that Independent Ink could not prevail on either
of its two antitrust claims.1

On appeal, the CAFC considered whether a plaintiff bringing an antitrust claim
has the burden of proving that a defendant's patent confers market power in the
tying product market.18 The CAFC concluded that a patent "presumptively defines
the relevant market for the patented product itself, and creates a presumption of
power within this market. Once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, it
is the defendant's burden to rebut the presumption of market power and consequent
illegality that arises from patent tying." 19 This conclusion was based on an analysis
of prior Supreme Court opinions in this area. However, the CAFC conceded the
absence of any Supreme Court case directly on point, and stated that it was "obliged
20
to follow" the "clearly articulated dicta."
This comment addresses the implications of this holding. Section I discusses the
history of patent tying case law, antitrust law in general, and the dicta from which
the CAFC chose to create this rule. Section II analyzes the two types of tests applied
to tying agreements. Section III addresses how this holding will increase the amount
of antitrust claims brought against patentees because of the "presumption of market
power" applied to a patentee. Section III also proposes that the antitrust inquiry into
patent tying agreements should be no different from the inquiry for general (nonpatent) tying agreements. Section IV concludes with a summary of significant
points.

I. TYING LAW BACKGROUND
Part A of this section begins with a discussion of tying agreements in general
and the cases which have been relied on to develop rules with respect to these
agreements. Part B discusses the history of tying agreements with respect to
patents, including a discussion of the earliest cases which addressed patent tying
agreements and the changes in the Court's treatment of the subject over the years.

16Id. at 1345. Independent Ink initially filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity against Trident's patents. Id. It subsequently amended its complaint to
allege that Trident was engaged in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Trident on both claims. Id.
17 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002) [hereinafter
-ndep.-nkA]. Independent Ink alleged that Trident's agreements were restraining trade in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act by preventing end users from purchasing printer ink from third parties
(such as Independent Ink) and that Trident was monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and
conspiring to monopolize the market for ink used in Trident's print head system in violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 1159.
18Indop. Ink-IT 396 F.3d at 1346.
19 Id. at 1352.
20 Id.at 1351.
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A. Tying Agreements: Development of the Rules
The original objection to tying agreements was that they enabled an increase of
seller monopoly power by spreading this power from the tying market to the tied
market. 21 This assumed, however, that the seller was in fact a monopolist, or had
some sort of market power. However, not all tying agreements have anticompetitive
consequences, and in reality, a monopoly in the tied market rarely occurs. 22 Many
tying agreements actually benefit the consumer because the packaged sale enables
an overall reduction in price, and most tying agreements have no restraining effect
23
on competition.
Even though the Sherman Act purports to prohibit every restraint of trade,24 it
has been applied to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, though certain
restraining agreements are inherently or per se unreasonable. 25 The two types of
26
antitrust analyses used by the Court are the per se standard and the rule of reason.
Under the per se standard, certain classes of agreements that are presumptively

21POSNER, supra note 9, at 197; see also Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131,
139, 140 (1936) (suggesting that it would be possible for a seller with monopoly power in the market
for business machines to obtain a monopoly of punch cards as well, simply by refusing to sell or lease
its machines unless the purchaser or lessee agreed to use only the seller's punch cards in the
machines); Int'l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-396 (1947).
The appellant's patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward.

From them appellant derives a right to restrain others from making, vending or
using the patented machines. But the patents confer no right to restrain use of,
or trade in, unpatented salt. By contracting to close this market for salt against
competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its
patents afford no immunity from the antitrust laws.
Id.; Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (stating that the
existence of market power in the tying product market allows the presumption that this
power will be used to gain power in the tied product market as well).
22 United States v. Microsoft Co., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that tying in software
markets may produce efficiencies not previously considered by the courts and that many contractual
ties benefit consumers through higher output and reduced transaction costs).
23 Soo Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) ("Buyers often find
package sales attractive; a seller's decision to offer such packages can merely be an attempt to
compete effectively-conduct that is entirely consistent with the Sherman Act."); see also N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958).
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so
that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the
tied item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would
obviously be insignificant at most. As a simple example, if one of a dozen food
stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar
it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were ready
and able to sell flour by itself.
Id.
24 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
25PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1719b (2d ed. 2000).
26 POSNER, supra note 9, at 38-39. The distinction between the rule of reason analysis and the
per se standard is a fundamental legal distinction between a rule and a standard: "A rule singles
out a few facts and makes them legally determinative. A standard allows a more open-ended
inquiry. Rules are generally simpler and cheaper to enforce than standards and provide clearer
guidance both to the people subject to them and to the courts that administer them." Id. at 39.
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unreasonable are struck down. 27 Under the rule of reason analysis, all factors are
taken into account, especially an agreement's potential effect on the market. Under
this more thorough inquiry, only those agreements that are found to unreasonably
interfere with competition are struck down. 28
Factors that are taken into
consideration by the courts when deciding whether to apply the per se standard or
rule of reason include increased efficiency and market outputs.

29

In 1969 in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., hereinafter
Fortner I,the Court reaffirmed the applicability of the per se standard for general
tying agreements without the necessity for inquiry into the amount of market power
held by a defendant. 30 Market power was inferred from the desirability of the
product (in this case, credit) to consumers or "uniqueness in its attributes."3 1 The
presence of any "appreciable restraint" on competition was enough to condemn a
tying agreement.3 2 This was a boldly stated rule that would have struck down many
pro-competitive agreements had it lasted. However, it was not followed for long.
Four of the Supreme Court Justices disagreed with the rule set out in Fortner
.33
In their dissenting opinions, these Justices discussed the benefits of tying
27Id.

Id.

at 38-39.

This rule was first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
66-67 (1911). The Court's opinion was unclear with respect to this rule and the Court has not since
made it clearer. POSNER, supra note 9, at 38. This rule allows for a "fuller and more flexible inquiry
into the economic consequences of a challenged agreement." Id. at 38.
2) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 1719b; see also Hovenkamp et al., Antieompetitive
Settlement ofIntellectualPropertyDisputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2003).
Antitrust generally applies the "rule of reason" to practices that present some
potential for competitive harm but also hold out the promise of social gains. Such
practices cannot be assessed without an inquiry into the defendant's individual or
collective
market power and a determination of competitive
effects.
Fundamentally, the antirust tribunal wants to know whether the challenged
practice is likely to increase or decrease market output. By contrast, antitrust
applies the "per se rule" when it has sufficient experience to conclude that a
certain class of practices is so likely to be anticompetitive without offsetting social
benefits that the much more expensive and cumbersome analysis required by the
rule of reason is unnecessary.
[d.
'30
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969) [hereinafter
Fortner 1]. The Court relied on InternationalSalt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(patented tying product), United States v.Loews, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (copyrighted tying product),
and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (land as the tying product) as
examples of cases where the Court held that the uniqueness of the these tying products conferred
economic power without inquiry into market power because other competitors were prevented from
offering these distinctive products. Fortner ,394 U.S. at 506 n.2. InternationalSalt was the first
case in which the Court applied per se analysis to tying agreements. Int'l Salt, Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
'3lFortner1 394 U.S. at 503. In this case, the agreement conditioned the purchase of credit on
the purchase of pre-fabricated homes. Id. at 497. The district court held that the petitioner,
Fortner, had failed to prove that United States Steel Corporation had market power in the credit
market, but this Court reversed. Id. at 497-98; see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45
(1962).
32 Fortnerj,394 U.S. at 503 ("Such appreciable restraint results whenever the seller can exert
some power over some of the buyers in the market, even if his power is not complete over them and
over all other buyers in the market.") (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 510 (White, J., dissenting) ("Provision of favorable credit terms may be nothing more
or less than vigorous competition in the tied product, on a basis very nearly approaching the price
28
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agreements, and argued that the majority holding had departed from established
doctrine by not requiring proof of market power. 4 Eight years later in FortnerII, the
Court reversed the holding of FortnerIwith respect to this point.3 5 FortnerII held
that market power may not be inferred from "mere uniqueness" of the product, and
that in order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove the defendant had market power in
36
the relevant market.

B. HistoricalDevelopment of Patent Tying Case Law and the PerSe Standard
Patent tying agreements are subject to both patent and antitrust law. The
patent policy of encouraging innovation via a grant of a limited legal monopoly is at
37
odds with the antitrust policy of prevention of restraints on competition and trade.
The government grants exclusive rights to inventors in exchange for the public
disclosure of their inventions. This in turn allows the general public to benefit from
these inventions.38 This governmental grant of a legal monopoly has led to conflict

competition which it has always been the policy of the Sherman Act to encourage."). "The effect of
this novel extension-this distortion, as I view it-of the tying doctrine may be vast and
destructive." Id. at 524 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
34 Id.
at 511, 514 n.9 (White, J. and Harlan, J. dissenting) (stating that tie-ins may be
beneficial to the economy by facilitating entry into markets where established sellers have
established customers, by allowing price cutting for products that otherwise have no price
competition at all, by protecting the reputation of the tying product via ensuring it will function
correctly by using it with the tied product, and by reducing costs through economies of joint
production and distribution). "[T]he fact that tie-ins are not entirely unmitigated evils should be
borne in mind." Id.
3 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977) [hereinafter
Fortnerll. In FortnerI the Court remanded the case to give Fortner the opportunity to prove that
petitioner United States Steel Corp.'s Home Division and Credit Corp. possessed "appreciable
economic power" in the market for the tying product (credit). Fortne-rj,394 U.S. at 509. In Fortner
II, the Court addressed only the issue of whether Fortner had proven that the petitioners held such
market power, FortnerI, 429 U.S. at 611-12, and the Court held that Fortner had not met this
burden of proof, stating that the "unique character of its financing" does not automatically give rise
to a presumption of market power. Id. at 622.
3 Id.
37 See generalyAxis S.P.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Our patent and antitrust laws seek to further different and opposing policies.
Patent laws grant a monopoly for a limited time in order "[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of... useful [a]rts .. " Antitrust laws, on the other hand, are designed
to promote and protect competition in the marketplace. Thus, a lawfully acquired
patent creates a monopoly that does not violate the antitrust laws.
Id.
'38 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process,
of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating the authorization for the grant of limited
monopoly is to "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
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with antitrust law which seeks to limit the monopolizing practices that lead to
39

restraints of trade and unfair competition.
In the earliest cases addressing patent tying agreements, after the Sherman
Act 40 was passed in 1890, the Supreme Court tended to favor the exclusionary
41
statutory rights granted to patentees over the restraints imposed by antitrust law.
The "general rule" was that patentees could legally impose any and all restrictions on
the use of their patent. 42 If tying the sale of one product to the sale or license of
another patented product would improve the patented product's performance, then
43
this was a legal means to a legitimate end.
Later, in a 1917 landmark patent infringement case, Motion PicturePatents Co.
v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court overruled its earlier

... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
While one great object [of our patent laws] was, by holding out a reasonable
reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a
limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was "to promote
the progress of... useful arts."
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to
inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to
the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in
granting and securing that monopoly.
Id.
31 See generallyLouis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813 (1984).
4015 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
41See Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 291 (6th Cir.
1896) (commonly known as the Button Fastenercase). The patentee conditioned the sale of his
patented button-fastening machines on the purchase of unpatented staples ("fasteners") for use with
the machine. Id. at 289-90. The Sixth Circuit held that the agreement was lawful. Id. at 301. Any
control that the patent holder achieved over the non-patented product would last only until the
patented machine was superseded by a more efficient button-fastening machine. Id. at 296.
Therefore, the conditional license was "neither obnoxious to public policy, nor an illegal restraint of
trade." Id. This case also emphasized the importance of protecting the freedom of contract and the
paramount public policy of not interfering with this freedom. Id. at 294.
In Henry v. Dick Co., the patent held on a mimeograph machine was sold with the license
restriction that it could only be used with the stencil paper, ink, and other (unpatented) supplies
made by the patentee. Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11 (1912). The Court found that the patentee
merely had chosen to take his profit through the sale of accessories rather than by charging a high
purchase price for the mimeograph machines. Id. at 32. "By selling it subject to the restriction he
took nothing from others and in no [way] restricted their legitimate market." Id.
In United States v. Winslow, the patentees leased patented shoe machines to shoe
manufacturers on the condition that the manufacturers use only the patentee's machines. United
States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1913). If they were to purchase a machine from any other
manufacturer, the lease and the patented machine would be rescinded. Id. See generally John F.
Hornick, The Per Se Rule in Tying Contexts.'A Critical View., 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 703 (1986).
42 Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) ("[T]he general rule is absolute freedom
in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. . . . The fact that the
conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.").
43 Winslow, 227 U.S. at 218 (using the example of one corporation making every individual
part of a single steam engine and also putting the engine together being just as lawful as if one
company made the boilers and another made the wheels that went into the single steam engine).
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holdings. 44 The Court held that patent law granted only the exclusionary rights to
the patented device and nothing more.45 These rights did not include the right to
restrict any of the materials to be used in operating the patented device, nor did it
46
include the right to impose conditions regarding the use of the device.
This trend away from absolute protection of the patentee in patent tying cases
continued for many years with numerous cases holding that the "patent privilege"
had been extended in violation of the Sherman Act. 47 In these later patent tying
cases, the proof of "sufficient economic power" that was necessary to establish an
antitrust violation was inferred or presumed by the lawful patent monopoly. 48 Note,
however, that there is a legal distinction between the terms "market power" and
"economic power," though the Court tends to use them interchangeably. 49
In InternationalSalt Co. v. United States, the Court relied on Mereoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Co.50 for the proposition that the patents held by
International Salt to cover their salt machines did not give International Salt the
44 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (expressly
overruling Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)). The patent in this case covered a part of the
mechanism used in "motion picture exhibiting machines." Id. at 505. The license agreement
contained restrictions including the condition that the machines shall be used solely with the motion
pictures of the patentee. Id. at 506-07. The Court held that the restriction was invalid because the
motion pictures were not any part of the invention of the patent and because it was an attempt to
improperly extend the patent monopoly outside the scope of patent law. Id. at 518.
45 d. at 510.
46 Id.
at 512; see also Morton Salt Co. v. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) ("It is the
adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the
patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the
particulardefendant has suffered from the misuse ofthe patent.) (emphasis added).
47See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co, 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963).
[B]eyond the limited monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the
patent is utilized are subject to the general law, and it is equally well settled that
the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent
monopoly. By aggregating patents in one control, the holder of the patents cannot
escape the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. That Act imposes strict limitations on
the concerted activities in which patent owners may lawfully engage ....
Id. (citations omitted); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947) (stating that the
tying agreement in the lease provides a measure of protection to the lessee in terms of ensuring
performance of the salt machine, but does not avoid the "stifling effect of the agreement on
competition"); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942) (stating that the power
of the patentee to exercise his statutory rights is not unlimited, and when a patented product is
leased to another, the legal monopoly no longer protects the patentee).
48 See William Montgomery, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and
CopyrightedProductsin TyingArrangements,85 COLUMB. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (1985).
49 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:22, at 422 n.28 (2004 ed. 1983)
(explaining that there is a lesser amount of market power required for a tying claim than is required
for a claim of actual monopolization under the Sherman Act, which is why the courts refer to market
power as "economic power" in tying contexts); see Fortner , 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) ("Market
power is . . . a source of serious concern . . . regardless of whether the seller has the greatest
economic power possible or merely some lesser degree of appreciable economic power."); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462-464 (1992) (referring to "economic power"
and "market power" interchangeably when discussing the tying claim).
50Mercoid Corp., Inc. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944) ("[A]n
unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to monopolistic protection than any
other unpatented device.").
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right to restrain trade in the market for salt. 51 InternationalSalt, the last patent
tying case decided by the Supreme Court, has been cited for the proposition that a
patent creates a presumption of market power. 52 However, Mercoid Corp., the case
which the International Salt Court relied on for this proposition, has been
53
legislatively overruled, and as a result, makes this proposition suspect.

C. FurtherDevelopment of Tying Law: The PerSe Standard
In Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States, the Court eliminated
the requirement of proof of economic or market power, and the per se standard was
applied to tying agreements once again, relying on and reaffirming the rule laid out
in InternationalSalt.54 The Court stated that the purpose behind the application of
the per se standard is to avoid "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
55
investigation.., an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."
In United States v. Loew's, Inc.,56 the Court attempted to limit the per se
standard by holding that per se condemnation was no longer warranted without proof
of "sufficient economic power."5 7 The Court gave little guidance, however, as to what

this proof would constitute. 58 Once a tying agreement was found to exist in an area
where the owner of the tied product had "sufficient economic power," the agreement
was found illegal "without elaborate inquiry as to ...the business excuse for [its]
use." 59 Furthermore, the Court stated that this economic power would be presumed

51Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947).
52 See Indep. InkI, 396 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,73 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S.
June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1329).
53 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2001). No patent owner will be guilty of "misuse or illegal extension of
the patent right" for conditioning the license of any rights to the patent on the "purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned." Id.
51 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958). The issue in this case was whether
defendant railway's "preferential routing" agreements were illegal restraints of trade under § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 3-4. The Court relied on InternationalSalt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) to hold that they were. Id. at 12. In InternationalSalt, however, the Court "held the
challenged tying arrangements unlawful despite the fact that the tying item was patented, not
because of it." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original); see also Hornick, supra note 41, at 704, 714.
55N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
56 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962). In this case, individual distributors
of copyrighted films were held to have illegally "block booked"-conditioned the sale ("license") of
one copyrighted film on the sale of another (usually inferior), non-copyrighted film. Id. at 40, 52.
57Id. at 45.
58 Loews, 371 U.S. at 45 (citing N Pae.Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6) (declaring that the seller must
have "sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product .. .").In all of these cases it is apparent that some
amount of economic or market power in the tying product market is necessary for a tying agreement
to be condemned; however, the Court fails to set out any guidelines as to what would constitute this
'sufficient economic power."
59 Loews, 371 U.S. at 52 (citing N Pac. fly. Co., 356 U.S. at 5).
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whenever the tying product is patented. 60 Thus, with respect to patentees, this
61
attempt at limiting the per se standard had little effect.
In 1984, in the landmark Jefferson Parish HospitalDistrict No. 2 v. Hyde,
the Court upheld the validity of an exclusive services contract between a hospital and
a group of anesthesiologists.

62

Here, the allegedly "tying" product was the hospital

operating rooms, and the "tied" product was the anesthesia services.63 In this case,
the Court stated that the per se standard should only be applied to agreements in
64
which anticompetitive "forcing" is probable.

D. Rule ofReason
Once a plaintiff in a tying antitrust case fails to prevail under the per se
standard, a court may then proceed to apply the rule of reason. 65 However, the
Supreme Court has generally given little guidance regarding application of the rule
of reason. 66 The courts that apply the rule of reason usually note briefly that the
plaintiff has failed to define a relevant market or has otherwise failed to show any
significant threat to the health of competition in the tied market. 67 This was the
situation in the Jefferson Parish case, where an unreasonable restraint on
competition could not be found without "an inquiry into the actual effect of the
exclusive contract on competition among anesthesiologists" (the tied product).68

60 Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45; see also Montgomery, supra note 48, at 1143.

61 Id. at 45-46 (citing the list of cases from which the presumption of economic power for
patented products developed and stating that "a patentee who utilized tying arrangements would be
denied all relief against infringements of his patent").
62Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S. 2, 32 (1984).
63 Id. at 8.
61 Id. at 15. Forcing describes a situation where a purchaser is "forced" into buying a product
he did not otherwise want. Id.
Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to
force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.
When such "forcing" is present, competition on the merits in the market for the
tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.
Id. at 12. InternationalBusiness Machines v. UnitedStates was one of the earliest cases specifically
addressing tying arrangements. 298 U.S. 131 (1936). In this case, agreements conditioning the
lease of patented mechanical tabulation machines on the purchase of punch cards for use with the
machine were found to be illegal. Id. at 140. Although IBM argued that the use of IBM cards was
essential to the successful performance of the leased machines, the Court stated that there was no
reason other manufacturers could not meet the high degree of precision required for use in IBM the
machines, and held that IBM could not "force" consumers to buy the cards from them. Id. at 138-39.
65 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 1728f.
66 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 1728f ('[T]he cases give little guidance on how the
rule of reason should be applied to tie-ins."); see POSNER, supra note 9, at 38-39.
(7See Fortner ,394 U.S. at 499-501. In this case, the Court insisted that the rule of reason
remained available even if a per se claim failed because of insufficient power or dollar volume to
satisfy the per se rule. Id.
(3 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984).
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The Court stated that the plaintiff has the burden of showing the actual effect of
the tying agreement on competition in the tied market. 69 Because the market had
not been defined and the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to find that the
contract unreasonably restrained competition, the Court concluded that the tying
agreement did not violate the antitrust laws.7 0 "[W]ithout a showing of actual
adverse effect on competition, [plaintiff] cannot make out a case under the antitrust
71
laws, and no such showing has been made."
This "rule" is not a set standard of behavior, but a general inquiry into whether
"all the circumstances" show that the challenged practice "imposes an unreasonable
72
restraint on competition."
Relevant circumstances can include such diverse factors as the defendants'
intent and purpose in adopting the restriction; the structure of and
competitive conditions within the affected industry; the relative competitive
positions of the defendants; the presence of economic barriers inhibiting the
ability of competitors to respond and offset the challenged practice; and
apparent justifications for the restriction such as enhanced efficiencies,
protection of product or service goodwill, and inducing dealer loyalty. No
single such factor is decisive. Rather, the factfinder "weighs all of the
circumstances" in deciding whether the challenged practice is
7 3
competitively unreasonable.
A fundamental question must be answered when antitrust law is applied to
patent practices: Do tying agreements fall within the scope of privileges granted by
the patentee's legal monopoly?74 As evidenced from the conflicting case law, the
courts lack a clear method for resolving this inquiry.7 5 The CAFC in Independent
Ink, however, claimed a duty to follow precedent set by the Court.7 6 The question
remains: What is the exact precedent to be followed?
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Td. at 31. "There is no evidnen that the price, the quality, or the supply or demand for
either the 'tying product' or the 'tied product' involved in this case has been adversely affected by the
exclusive contract between [plaintiff] and the hospital." Id.
72 HOLMES, supranote 49, § 2:10, at 253-54.
73Id.at 254.
74CHISUM, supranote 5, § 19.04(2).
7,Id.; ef Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216-17 (9th Cir.
1997).
The relevant market for determining the patent or copyright grant is
determined under patent or copyright law .... The relevant markets for antitrust
purposes are determined by examining economic conditions.

...At the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court.
Id.; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958); ("Of course it is common
knowledge that a patent does not always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity. Often the
patent is limited to a unique form or improvement of the product and the economic power resulting

from the patent privileges is slight."). See generallyLandes & Posner, supra note 11, at 977-79.
76Indep. Ink If 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert• granted,73 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S.
June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1329).
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II.

ANALYSIS

Parts A and B of this section discuss the two types of antitrust analyses the
Court applies to tying agreements. Part A analyzes the per se standard and Part B
analyzes the rule of reason. Both parts apply the relevant test to Sports Fan's patent
tying agreement and the IndependentInk case currently before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to decide the narrow issue of
whether inquiry into the market power of a patented tying product should be
different from the inquiry into the market power of a non-patented tying product for
purposes of an antitrust tying claim. The guidelines set forth in the most recent
general tying cases decided by the Court are a good indication of what factors will be
considered. The Court must decide if these general guidelines should be applied
more specifically to patent tying cases. Not all patents confer market power in a
relevant market, 77 so the existence of a patent in the tying market should not render
a tying agreement presumptively illegal. Instead, there should be inquiry into the
amount of relevant market power held by the patented product. Patent tying
agreements should be evaluated by the same standards as all other tying
78
agreements.

A. The PerSe Standard:FourRequirements
In order to establish an illegal tying agreement, the per se standard requires
proof of four threshold elements: the existence of two separate products or services,
the presence of anticompetitive forcing, a definition of relevant markets, and a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce affected by the tie. 79 As such, the per se standard
for tying agreements is different from pure standards of per se illegality where a
situation is rendered illegal by mere proof of its existence.8 0 Similar to pure per se

[I]t is the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court
until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them. This message has been
conveyed repeatedly to the court. The Court's decisions remain binding precedent
until it sees fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have
raised doubts about their continuing validity .... Even where a Supreme Court

precedent contains many "infirmities" and rests upon "wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations," it remains the Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents.... The time may have come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up to
the Congress or the Supreme Court to make this judgment.
Id. In the very next paragraph, however, the Court states: "In this area, unfortunately, there is no
Supreme Court case directly addressing the issue, and we are required to ascertain the rule from
dictum." Id.
77 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7 (1984) (plurality opinion)
('A common misconception has been that a patent.., suffices to demonstrate market power.").
78 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
§ 5.3
(1995),
available
at

LICENSING

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/uidelines/ipguide.htm ("The Agencies will not presume that a patent
...necessarily confers market power upon its owner.").
7)See Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
80 HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:22, at 408.
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standards however, the per se standard for tying agreements shifts the burden to the
8
defendant to overcome the presumption of illegality. '

1. SeparateProducts
The first element requires proof that the allegedly tied and tying items are in
fact separate products or services.8 2 This separate product inquiry varies with each
case and is very fact intensive.8 3 The governing standard is that there must be
sufficient demand for the purchase of the tied product separate from the demand for
the tying product, and there must be a distinct product market in which it is efficient
84
to offer both products separately.
Included in the separate product inquiry is a broad range of market factors.
These factors include buyer perceptions and demand characteristics that aid in
determining whether the items are economically part of the same overall service
market (no tie), or properly fall into different markets for which separate consumer
demand exists (tying possible).85 Applying the separate product inquiry to Sports
Fan's hypothetical glasses-holding apparatus and the baseball hat conditionally
purchased for use with the apparatus results in these items falling into separate
categories. There are customers who desire to purchase hats separately from the
apparatus, and this creates a distinct market where it would be more efficient to offer
each product separately.8 6 In addition, customers who already own baseball hats
would be in the market to purchase the apparatus separately.
SI Id. (stating that it would be less confusing to label the standard "presumed" illegality).
82

Id. at 409.

Erik B. Wulff and Scott A. McIntosh, The Separate Product Test in Franchise Tying Cases:
Through the Microsoft Lens of Reason, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 70, 71 (2001). The separate product
inquiry becomes especially difficult in franchise agreements where a franchised trademark or
service mark is tied to materials used in the franchised business. Id.
A number of courts have held that equipment, food ingredients, and packaging
are products separate and distinct from the licensed trademark or the bundle of
intellectual property rights constituting the franchise. Other courts have held that
the finished product being distributed through a product distribution franchise or
key ingredients for the finished product in a business format franchise (such as
KFC's secret chicken seasoning) are so interrelated with the trademark or the
franchise system that they are not separate products for purposes of a tying
analysis.
83

Id.
81 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 514 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) ("For service and parts to be considered two
distinct products, there must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to
provide service separately from parts."); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir.
2001) ("The consumer demand test is a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may, on
balance, be welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per se condemnation."); Wulff & McIntosh, supra
note 83, at 71-72.
85 HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:22, at 409; see also Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 21-22 (stating
that no tying agreement can exist unless there is a sufficient demand for the purchase of
anesthesiological services (tied product) separate from hospital services (tying product) to identify a
distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer the services separately).
86 See Times-Picayune Pubrg Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953) (holding that a
publishing company's contracts for the sale of advertising space in morning and evening papers
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The district court in Independent Ink found that the plaintiff failed to
sufficiently address the separate product inquiry. 8 7 Independent Ink merely asserted
that two distinct products exist because of the functional distinction between the
tying product (printhead technology) and the tied product (ink for use with that
technology).88 The court stated that two products are considered separate depending
on the character of the demand for the two items, not the functional relation between
them, and therefore found Independent Ink's assertion of separate products to be
89
insufficient.

2. Anticompetitive cForcing"
The second threshold element for an antitrust tying violation requires proof that
the tying product's availability for purchase has been conditioned on taking the tied
product or upon agreeing not to purchase the tied item from the seller's
competitors. 90 Stated differently, this element requires proof of anticompetitive
"forcing." 91 Forcing is not present in situations where a purchaser desires to buy the
92
separate products together, or is simply ignorant of other possible purchase choices.
Anticompetitive forcing exists when customers are forced into buying additional
products from the seller only because of the seller's market power in the tying
product market, rather than for the desirability of the packaged sale. 93 Thus, the
application of the per se standard, without inquiry into market power, focuses more
on the probability of anticompetitive consequences with respect to the consumer and
whether or not the consumer is able to maintain a choice, than with respect to the
94
effect on competition.
Sports Fan's agreement providing for the use of his patented apparatus on the
condition that the buyer also purchase a baseball hat becomes forcing only if the
buyer is precluded from purchasing additional hats elsewhere. There are a variety of
competitors that manufacture baseball hats that the consumer can choose from, and
constituted an indistinguishable product because no separate customer demand markets existed and
therefore that no dominant "tying" product existed).
87Indep. InkJ, 210 F.Supp. 2d 1155, 1163 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:22, at 416.
91 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) ("Per se condemnation.

is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable."). "Tying arrangements need only be
condemned if they restrain competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not otherwise
be made." Id. at 27.
92 Id.; see Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 29-30 (concluding that there was no evidence of any
patient who was prevented from going to another hospital of his choice for anesthesiologist services
and therefore no "forcing" present); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 443
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that it was not "forcing" for a pizza franchisor to require its franchisees to
purchase pizza dough and other ingredients from it or other approved sources where the alleged
"forcing" resulted from the contractual agreement and objecting franchisees could have bought a
different franchise).
93 Data Gen. Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908, 908-09 (1985) (White, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
94 Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 15-16. However, the Court did state that there must be a
'substantial potential for impact on competition in order to justify per se condemnation." Id. at 16.
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therefore there is no anticompetitive forcing involved. Similarly, the tying agreement
at issue in Independent Ink is an example of an agreement that does not contain
elements of anticompetitive forcing. The agreement does not prevent end users from
purchasing additionalink and ink containers from third party ink manufacturers
such as the plaintiff, and there are various manufacturers that offer ink for use in
the defendant's printhead system. 95 As long as the consumer retains a choice in
96
where to purchase the tied product, there is no anticompetitive forcing present.

3. Market Power
The third threshold element needed to establish an antitrust tying violation
requires proof of enough market power in the tying product market to appreciably
affect sales in the tied market.9 7 If the seller has no market power in the tying
market, purchasers will continue to go to other sources for the tying item and the
attempted tie will have no effect whatsoever. 98 A necessary precondition to satisfying
this third element of proof is the definition of the relevant market. 99
Most patented products fail to dominate an economic market. 10 0 In the case of a
lone inventor such as Sports Fan, at the outset his patented apparatus is not likely to
have a significant market even though his invention may be the only one of its kind.
There may be a large market for baseball hats, but a small entrepreneur starting out
in an industry is not likely to have the market power necessary to dominate the hat
market. Consumers will not be as familiar with the product brand name, and the
entrepreneur will not have the resources necessary to promote the product. These
factors weigh against the finding of the necessary market domination. The fact that
the apparatus is unique will weigh towards finding market power, but this is only

9, Indep. -Inkj210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
96See T. Harris Young & Assocs., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 821-23 (11th Cir.
1991) (finding that alleged warnings by an equipment manufacturer that its warranty would be void
if customers used generic supplies with its equipment, rather than supplies provided by the
manufacturer, did not constitute a tying agreement because customers remained free to purchase

the equipment without the supplies). "Only after the existence of a tie is shown is it necessary to
determine whether an llegal tying agreement exists." ITd.
97HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:22, at 421-22.
98

Id.

9 See Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 29-30 (holding that because plaintiffs failed to define the
relevant market for services of anesthesiologists (the tied product), they could not prevail and that
the hospital's (tying product) market share alone was insufficient as a basis to infer market power);
Indep. Ink IT 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,73 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S. June 20,
2005) (No. 04-1329) (reversing the district court opinion which found that because plaintiff
submitted no evidence to define the relevant market nor prove defendant's power within it, the
plaintiff could not prevail on either antitrust claim). Although the district court in IndependentInk
followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Jefferson Parish,the CAFC reversed nonetheless, holding
that "apatent presumptively defines the relevant market as the nationwide market for the patented
product itself, and creates a presumption of power within this market." Indep. Ink IT 396 F.3d at
1352.
100 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1722 n.6; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958) (stating that it is "common knowledge" that a patent does not always confer a
monopoly over the market for a particular commodity).

[5:94 2005]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

until similar products are developed, giving the consumer a choice of purchasing the
product elsewhere.101
The potential for market power exists because of the barriers to entry faced by
competitors seeking entry into the market for a specific product. 102 Strong consumer
preference for the product will also be a source of market power. 10 3 Market power will
be difficult to maintain in a market with adequate substitute products available
because consumers will often choose the substitute products, encouraging the
10 4
competitive market.
Sports Fan will be faeing such barriers to entry as opposed to creating barriers
for other competitors. Other entrepreneurs will be in similar (possibly better)
positions with respect to the amount of capital they must invest and what existing
consumer base they may draw from. In the case of new businesses entering the
market, no existing consumer preferences will be found to prove enough market
power to appreciably affect sales in the tied market.10 5 The district court in
Independent Ink noted that both parties agreed that market power was the
dispositive element in the case, 10 6 and held that Independent Ink failed to prove that
Trident held the requisite market power. 107

4. 'Not insubstantial"Amountof Commerce Foreelosed
The fourth and final element necessary to establish an antitrust violation
under the per se standard requires proof that a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce in the tied market has been affected.108 The Court has not specifically
addressed what amount of commerce is considered not insubstantial, but a showing
101 Hornick, supra note 41, at 715 (stating that market power may be presumed if there are no
viable substitutes for the patented product).
102

Montgomery, supra note 48, at 1150; see alsoFortnerj394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969).

Barriers to entry in the market for the tied product are raised since, in order to

sell to certain buyers, a new company not only must be able to manufacture the
tied product, but also must have sufficient financial strength to offer [the tied
product]

comparable

to

that provided

by larger

competitors

under

tying

arrangements. If the larger companies have achieved economies of scale in their
[tied product], they can of course exploit these economies legitimately by lowering
their credit charges to consumers who purchase credit only, but economies ...

should not ... be used to exert economic power over other products that the
company produces no more efficiently than its competitors.
Id. In Independent Ink j Independent Ink argued that Trident's tying arrangements constituted a
barrier to entry, but the court declined to address this issue because Independent Ink's failure to
define the relevant markets was "fatal to its case." Indep. Ink1 210 F. Supp. 2d 1177 n.23 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
103

Montgomery, supra note 48, at 1150.

104

Id.

105

See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY

MATERIALS, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY,

Sept. 2000, Course Number SF63 ("If a potential

competitor has a promising product, other distributors will be delighted to carry it; if there are no
other distributors, new ones will appear ..
")
106 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
107 Id. at 1177.
108 HOLMES, supranote 49, § 2:22, at 431.
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that some dollar amount (rather than market share) of business has been "foreclosed"
is usually sufficient.1 0 9 In FortnerI, a tie foreclosing $200,000 annually of housing
purchases was held to be substantial,1 10 and in United States v. Loew'%, Inc. a sum of
$61,000 foreclosed by illegal "block booking" was held to be "not insubstantial".11 1
This inquiry has no clear standard associated with it, but must be determined on a
case by case basis.

112

Sports Fan's agreements fail to foreclose any significant or "not
insubstantial" dollar amount of business in the tied market for baseball hats. The
market for baseball hats is established. There will be many consumers interested in
buying baseball hats who will not be interested in buying the new glasses-holding
apparatus. The plaintiff in Independent Ink failed to sufficiently address whether
Trident's sales of printer ink (the tied product) involved a "not insubstantial" amount
113
of commerce.
In sum, the Court's general purpose in applying the per se standard is to prevent
an extensive antitrust inquiry. A more thorough inquiry, like one that is applied
under the rule of reason, balances anticompetitive effects with pro-competitive
benefits that arise from a tying agreement. 114 Courts are more inclined to use the per
se standard to avoid "the burdensome and lengthy trials that often occur under the
rule of reason."115 The per se standard against tying provides neither guidance nor
1 16
simplification for businesses trying to understand and comply with antitrust law.
The per se standard does not require a plaintiff to show that a tying agreement
has an anti-competitive effect in the tied market.117 Most tying agreements benefit
competition, even when a defendant has power in the tying product market.118 Tying

Id; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 172 1b.
110Fortner 1 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969) (stating that the volume of commerce allegedly
foreclosed was substantial and that a sum of almost $200,000 was not insubstantial).
111 United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962). The "block booking" held to be illegal in
this case was the conditioning of the sale or license of one or more feature films upon the acceptance
by the television stations (purchasers) of a package or block containing one or more unwanted or
inferior films. Id.at 40.
112 Soo gcnorallyAREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 1721b.
11 Indep. InkI,210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
114 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 486-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109

Per so rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and
experience show that the risk of injury to competition from the defendant's
behavior is so pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual
judicial inquiry into the balance between the behavior's pro-competitive benefits
and its anticompetitive costs.

Id.
115 Montgomery, supra note 48, at 1140.

& HOVENKAMP, supranote 25, § 1720a.
Id; see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9 (1958) ([J]t was deemed irrelevant

16 AREEDA
117

that there was no evidence as to the actual effect of the tying clauses upon competition.").
1ISSee N Pae. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 9; see also Eastman Kodak, 514 U.S. at 478-79 (stating that
competition is enhanced when a firm is able to offer various marketing options, including bundling
of support and maintenance service with the sale of equipment, and that these actions are
acceptable under the antitrust laws); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-13
(1984) (stating that buyers often find package sales attractive and that a seller's decision to offer
such packages can merely be an attempt to compete effectively-conduct entirely consistent with the
Sherman Act); Leslie, supra note 9, at 1774 ("Correctly characterizing the substance of each tying
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agreements enable a producer to exert quality control over his product by ensuring
use of only the highest quality parts, to control free-riding (in the franchise context),
and to obtain a profit via joint economies of scale and lower production costs. 119 Such
tying agreements do not fall within the category of restraints that ordinarily define
the boundaries of the per se standard. 120 As the Court in Jefferson Parish noted,
tying may be permissible when necessary to enable a new business (such as Sports
Fan's) to break into the market. 121 Antitrust law does not prohibit tying agreements,
122
it prohibits restraints of trade.

B. Rule of Reason Analysis
The essential first step in a rule of reason inquiry is the identification of the
123
relevant product and geographic markets in which the tying product competes.
This includes identifying the particular industry as well as the groups of products
and services with which the product competes. 124 In the case of patent tying, this
inquiry becomes crucial.
Returning to Sports Fan and the glasses-holding apparatus, if a competitor were
to allege an illegal tying agreement and bring an antitrust action, this competitor
must first define the relevant geographic and product markets in which he alleges
that the patented apparatus competes. 125 The geographic market will be defined by
the scope of advertising or by the location of potential consumers. Whether or not
there are similar devices or substitute products available and what markets they
operate in will also be taken into account.126
arrangement will restore doctrinal consistency to antitrust law and insure that anticompetitive tieins are condemned, while protecting beneficial or benign tying arrangements.").
119 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supranote 25, § 1728f2.
120 Id.
121 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 23 n.39 (1984).
122

Id. at 22 n.34.

HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:10, at 256; see Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 7 ("The exclusive
contract had an impact on two different segments of the economy: consumers of medical services,
and providers of anesthesiological services.").
124 HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:10, at 256; see Indep. Inkj, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1168 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
In order to define a product market, a party must determine the cross-elasticity of
demand, or which products are reasonably interchangeable with the product at
issue from the perspective of consumers. Defining a product market also entails
consideration of potential competitors who may enter the market, viz., crosselasticity of supply.
Id. Independent Ink argued that market definition is irrelevant in a patent tying case. Id.
However, the district court rejected that argument, stating that without a proper market definition,
the plaintiff cannot establish that the relevant product market contains barriers to entry. Id. at
1172.
125 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-30 (stating that there was insufficient evidence in the
record to provide a basis for finding that the contract at issue unreasonably restrained competition
as it operates in the market because the relevant market had not been defined, and this was fatal to
plaintiffs claim).
126 Id.
at 7-8.
The District Court in Jofferson Parish found the entire New Orleans
metropolitan area as the relevant geographic market in which hospitals compete. This led it to
conclude that East Jefferson Hospital did not possess any significant market power, whereas the
123

[5:94 2005]

Patent Tying Agreements: Presumptively Illegal?

Sports Fan will initially be the only supplier of his unique patented apparatus.
This factor weighs towards finding market power for the tying product and against
Sports Fan in an antitrust action. Under a rule of reason analysis, however, this is
only one of many considerations that are taken into account.
The patent system operates to produce different effects depending on the
industry. 127 In the chemistry and pharmaceutical industries, a patent covers a single
product, in effect dominating the entire market for that product. 128 However, this
"one-to-one correspondence" is less common in most industries. 129
In the
semiconductor and automotive industries, for example, new products are so complex
that they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of different inventions. Each
supporting invention is covered by a separate patent, and the patents are often held
by different companies. 130 In this more common situation, there is less possibility
that existence of a single patented product will confer market power in the overall
product market.
131
After identification of the relevant markets, a "market power filter" is applied.
If a plaintiff cannot provide evidence of anticompetitive effects that result from the
tying agreement, he must show that the defendant possesses a sufficient amount of
market power to actually threaten competition. 132 This filter is applied to distinguish
the situations that actually threaten competition and therefore warrant further
analysis.133
The next steps in the rule of reason analysis include inquiry into the nature of
the challenged restraint and the restraint's likely competitive effect. 134 The factors
that aid in these determinations are given particular emphasis by the courts. 135 A
small company engaging in a tying agreement may be held to be reasonable, but the
same agreement might be held unreasonable when engaged in by a large company

Court of Appeals found the relevant geographic market to be the East Bank of Jefferson Parish, and
consequently found that East Jefferson Hospital did possess market power. Id. However, while the
District Court discussed the impact of the contract on both the patients and the anesthesiologists,
the Court of Appeals only discussed the impact of the contract on patients. Id. This underscores the
importance of the definition of relevant markets.
127 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1738.
128

Id.

129 Id.
130 Id.
1:31HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:10, at 260; see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d
958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Proof of market power . . . for many courts is a critical first step, or
,screen,' or 'filter,' which is often dispositive ....
If market power is found, the court may then
proceed under the rule of reason analysis to assess the procompetitive justifications of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct.").
132 HOLMES, supra note 49, § 2:10, at 260 (anticompetitive effects might include evidence of
reduced output or extra-competitive prices); see Fortnerj 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (stating that
market power is "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for reduced output is
the almost inevitable result of higher prices.").
1:3:3
HOLMES, supranote 49, § 2:10, at 260.
134 Id. at 262; see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781-82 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (identifying the following "four classical, subsidiary antitrust questions" that are part of
a "traditional rule of reason" analysis: "(1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its
likely anticompetitve effects? (3) Are there offsetting pro-competitive justifications? (4) Do the
parties have sufficient market power to make a difference?").
135 HOLMES, supranote 49, § 2:10, at 262.

[5:94 2005]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

because of its market power.13 6 Furthermore, courts have often considered the
intended purpose of a tying agreement as an indication of whether the agreement is
reasonable. 137 If the agreement was meant to further a legitimate business purpose,
such as facilitating entry into an established market or promoting competition, this
factor will weigh in favor of the agreement being be upheld. If the agreement's
138
intended effect is to suppress competition, it is more likely to be invalidated.
For example, a court will inquire into (or the plaintiff would be required to
prove) the intent and purpose behind Sports Fan's agreement and the overall
competitive effect on the corresponding markets. Under the rule of reason, all
purposes and potential effects of the challenged restriction will be evaluated. Sports
Fan's justifications will include increasing the marketability of his product (package
deals are more attractive to consumers) and using the increased sales volume as
leverage to gain entry into the market.
In sum, although courts may seek to shorten their inquiry by applying the per se
standard and shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to overcome the
presumption of market power in a patent tying case, this approach will result in
increased claims brought against patent holders. This is an unacceptable effect.
Therefore, patent tying agreements should be made subject to the rule of reason
analysis rather than the per se standard, and the presumption of market power
should not be upheld.

III. PROPOSAL
Section III of this paper proposes that tying agreements involving a patent
should be treated no differently than tying agreements without a patent, and that
proof of market power in the relevant market should be required to hold a patent
tying agreement illegal.

A. The AntitrustInquiry into Tying Agreements Should Be the Same for All
Products.
The fact that a tying agreement involves a patented product should not matter
for purposes of an antitrust inquiry.13 9 The Court should reconsider the earliest
cases which tended to favor patentees. 140 As discussed in Sections I and II, market
136 Id. at 266-67.
137 Id. at 269.
138 Id. at 269-70 (stating that good intentions will not necessarily save a restraint that has
unreasonable anticompetitive effects, but will simply assist the factfinder in judging the probable
effects of the restraint); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(relevant factors include "the facts particular to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed").
139 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1725.
140 See generallyBement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (stating the general rule
to be that a patentee could impose any and all restrictions on the license or use of his or her
patented invention); Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 (1911) (recognizing that by preventing a
patentee from conditioning the license of his patented invention, the patentee may choose to not
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power in the relevant market for the patented product does not automatically follow
from the fact that the product is patented. 141 Therefore, the presumption of market
power in patent tying cases should be eliminated.
The CAFC's decision in Independent Ink is reminiscent of an earlier time in
judicial history when it was generally understood that presumptions were legal
constructs developed to take the place of evidence that was otherwise, at no fault of
the offering party, unavailable. 142 When both parties are able to present evidence, as
was the case in Independent Ink, the need for the presumption ceases, and therefore
so should the presumption. 143 Applying a presumption unfairly eliminates the need
for such evidence and subverts the detailed economic analysis that is necessary in
144
other antitrust inquiries.
As Justice Blackmun stated in EastmanKodak,
Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has
preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the
"particular facts disclosed by the record." In determining the existence of
market power, and specifically the "responsiveness of the sales of one
product to price changes of the other," this Court has examined closely the
145
economic reality of the market at issue.

license his or her product at all, and that the patentee may only be choosing to make his or her
profit by the sale of additional articles rather than charging higher prices for the licenses).
141 See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-402 (1947) (holding that the
challenged tying agreements were unlawful despite the fact that the tying item was patented, not
because of it). "Inarriving at its decision, the Court placed no reliance on the fact that a patent was
involved nor did it give the slightest intimation that the outcome would have been any different if
that had not been the case." Hornick, supra note 41, at 714.
142 Sheppard Mullin, Of Bats and Sunshine: Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying
Case Alive but Rebuttable, Antitrust Law Blog, at http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/article-76-ofbats-abd-sunshine-presumption-of-market-power-in-p atent-tying-case-alive -but-rebuttable
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2005) (whereas in cases such as Independent Ink, information such as "expert
testimony or other credible economic evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand, the area of effective
competition, or other evidence of lack of market power" is readily available).
143 Id.
"Thus, as in Independent Ink, if there need be a presumption at all, it is surely a
rebuttable presumption, and one that should be litigated by the parties to the action in the good old
fashioned way: by the presentation of evidence." Id.
144 Brief for Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. and Trident, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 396 F.3d
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1196).
1451
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992); see also
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
[I]t should be remembered that this Court has often announced that each case
arising under the Sherman Act must be determined upon the particular facts
disclosed by the record, and that the opinions in those cases must be read in the
light of their facts and of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the
facts of those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier
decisions is to be applied.
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Antitrust enforcement in 2005 and beyond presents especially difficult questions
of fact due to the technical complexity of today's products and services. 146 The dicta
relied on by the CAFC in Independent Ink was taken from cases decided during a
period of time when products and markets were not as technologically advanced.
InternationalSalt, the last patent tying case before the Supreme Court, was decided
in 1947, almost sixty years ago. 147 Specifically, the line of cases and precedent relied
on in InternationalSalt were decided in a time which had simpler products and less
complex markets, suggesting a different outcome when re-evaluated today. 148 A
patent is a grant of a privilege-an exclusionary right, but it is not a grant of market
power. When a patent fails to confer market power, the Court should refrain from
149
fashioning a rule presuming that it does.
For purposes of market definition, there are a range of markets varying in scope
that may be chosen for use in an antitrust case.1 50 A broad market definition
describes one in which the market for distant substitutes for the product are part of
the calculation. A narrow market definition describes a market where only close
substitutes are included. 151 How the plaintiff chooses to define the relevant market
in which the defendant's tying agreements compete will have a significant impact on
152
the outcome of the case.
Application of the per se standard and presumption of market power for
patented products eliminates the need to define a relevant market. This foregoes the
inquires into market power and whether the alleged tie in effect produces any procompetitive benefits. This rule will strike down many tying agreements that would
actually benefit competition.
As Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion of the Jefferson Parish
153
decision, there are many benefits to tying agreements.
[Tie-ins] may facilitate new entry into fields where established sellers have
wedded their customers to them by ties of habit and custom ....
They may
permit clandestine price cutting in products which otherwise would have no
price competition at all because of fear of retaliation from the few other
producers dealing in the market. They may protect the reputation of the
tying product if failure to use the tied product in conjunction with it may
cause it to misfunction. . . . And, if the tied and tying products are
functionally related, they may reduce costs through economies of joint

146 Posner, supra note 105. For example, the computer software manufacturing industry,
internet-based businesses, and the communications services and equipment designed to support the
first two markets. Id.
147 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
11 See Posner, supra note 105 (stating that the courts and enforcement agencies do not the
resources to effectively regulate a very complex business sector that changes very rapidly).
149 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7 (1984) (plurality opinion)
('A common misconception has been that a patent.., suffices to demonstrate market power.").
150 Landes & Posner, supranote 11, at 978.
151 Id.
152 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7-8 (1984) (discussing that

different market definitions between the District Court and Court of Appeals led to different
outcomes).
153 Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring opinion); see also supra note 34.
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production and distribution ....
A tie-in should be condemned only when its
154
anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency.
As a result, the Court should require proof of market power in a patent tying
agreement. The Court should evaluate this proof, and balance the anti-competitive
consequences against the pro-competitive effects. This will ensure protection of the
patent privilege granted by the government to reward creativity and ingenuity.

B. Antitrust Law Must Give Clear Guidelines.
Antitrust law must be used consistently in order to give patentees clear rules
and guidance. Historically, antitrust law has been applied inconsistently, rendering
inherently discriminatory results. 155 Companies being sued for alleged violations of
antitrust law are required to change their practice if the Court rules against them.
In many of these situations, however, the company's competitors are not prevented
from engaging in the same type of practices. 156 For example, Microsoft was accused
157
of illegal tying in its exclusive dealing agreements with computer manufacturers.
When Microsoft was forced to change its practices, its competitors were free to
continue engaging the same practices explicitly forbidden to be engaged in by
Microsoft.158

Another reason that the application of antitrust law has led to unfair results is
because of the legal subjectivity involved: The Court has failed to set clear rules for
companies to follow. 159 Corporations may not know whether they are engaging in
prohibited practices due to the lack of clear standards and the confusing and
1 60
antiquated case law in this area.
If the purpose of antitrust law is to encourage competition and maximize
1 61
consumer welfare, then a corollary purpose should be to encourage efficiency.
Returning to the glasses-holding apparatus, Sports Fan may wish to produce the
baseball hats himself because he believes that another company could not produce
Jefferson Paih, 466 U.S. at 41.
supra note 4.
156 Id.
157 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs' claim
alleged that Microsoft's combination of Windows and Internet Explorer by contractual and
technological means constituted per se unlawful tying to the extent that those actions forced
Microsoft's customers to take Internet Explorer as a condition of obtaining Windows. Id.
58
1 Armentano, supra note 4.
If you think that this is unfair (as you should), remember that this is antitrust.
As the judge in the 1953 United Shoe Machinery case put it: it was morally
acceptable for the court to impose discriminatory requirements on the defendant,
United Shoe Machinery Corporation, and not on its competitors since United's
unique efficiency alreadyput it in a class by itself.
154
55

1 Armentano,

Id.
159 Id. Nor has Congress clarified any of the "rules" laid out by the Court in terms of how
exactly to define market share or what a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce would consist of.
See supra Section II A(4).
100 I-d. As a result, many companies accused of antitrust violations wind up settling. Id.
161 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 39 (stating that only when courts are sufficiently confident
that a practice is sociallyinefficient will courts strike the practice down as unreasonable).
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hats that would enable his invention to work as well. Furthermore, he may feel that
selling a hat and his invention together will benefit the consumer via lower cost or
less time spent researching and obtaining their purchase. Any exclusionary effect
that might occur in this case results from the superior efficiency of the tied sale, not
restraint of trade. These package sales work to promote customer satisfaction, 162 and
tying agreements which benefit consumers should not be held per se illegal.
There is no clear rule as to what degree of protection a patent warrants in the
marketplace for purposes of antitrust law. The grant of a patent is awarded in order
to
stimulate H]creativity; affording protection also reflects notions of fairness,
by not allowing others to enjoy the benefit of those inventions or works
without making appropriate compensation to their creators. However,
these values are secondary to the primary goals of the patent and copyright
laws-the production of more and better intellectual property, for the
benefit of the public, and with the greatest degree of public access
1 63
consistent with those other goals.
The Supreme Court should take this opportunity to re-examine the precedent
which Independent Ink bases its holding on. The rule the Court establishes must be
more consistent with the purpose of patent law: to promote invention. Furthermore,
this new rule must give patentees clear and consistent guidelines as to exactly how
much protection a patent in fact warrants.

IV. CONCLUSION
The CAFC's decision in Independent Ink has significant implications for patent
holders.
This landmark decision will undoubtedly encourage more antitrust
litigation unless its ruling is re-written by the Supreme Court. As it stands, this
ruling puts owners of a patented product at a disadvantage, when the purpose of
patent law is to extend an advantage in the form of a limited legal monopoly.
Patentees should be encouraged rather than discouraged from selling or leasing their
products, and this new rule will have the opposite effect.
However, there is no reason to apply per se illegality and a presumption of
market power to patent tying agreements when it has been established that not
every patent confers market power. The per se standard will work to discourage
patent holders from engaging in legitimately pro-competitive behavior which
stimulates growth and new technology. This pro-competitive behavior helps society
162

Id.

at 201 (justifying the use of a tying agreement in terms of efficiency). "To hold that the

tie-in unlawfully restricted competition is tantamount to saying that any time a monopolist decides
to handle a step in the production process internally rather than invite competitive bids, he is guilty
of monopolizing because he is unnecessarily restricting competition." Id. at 201-02; see Int'l. Bus.
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138-140 (1936); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 n.42 (1984) (arguing that the Court has rejected similar "goodwilr'
defenses for tying agreements, finding that the use of contractual quality specifications are
generally sufficient to protect quality without the use of a tying agreement).
163Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights:
Reflections on the Image Technical andXerox Decisions (forthcoming 2005) (6/8/05 Draft p.13).

[5:94 2005]

Patent Tying Agreements: Presumptively Illegal?

119

as a whole, and individual consumers as well. Applying antitrust law in this way
results in discouraging pro-competitive behavior. In this area, new means must be
chosen in order to further the intended goal of antitrust law: to promote fair
competition.
In order to promote the creative processes that patent law is intended to protect,
patent tying agreements should be treated the same way under antitrust law as all
other tying agreements. Because a patent may not confer market power, the fact
that a patent covers the tying product should not presumptively invalidate the tying
agreement. There should be a market power inquiry similar to the inquiry for any
other tying agreement challenged under antitrust law. This will ensure fair
treatment to tying agreements involving a patent, and allow lone inventors such as
Sports Fan to be able to reap the intended effects of both patent and antitrust law:
encouraging both innovation and pro-competitive behavior.

